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Restoring the Balance
Violence and Culture among the
Suri of Southern Ethiopia
Jon Abbink
'This country is spoiled now ... there is nothmg to be said anymore.
Suffermg, we will perish, this country has become dark.'
(Last 1995: 153)
Violence as a Problem
Violent action is social behaviour and can be more fully understood in a
theoretical perspective which sees humans as social animais with a
capacity for symbol manipulation and social construction of 'meaning'.
This capacity is a dimension of human behaviour which enters into the
very définition of reality itself by both subjects and observers. When this
perspective is combined with a sociological-historical theory based on
Weberian ideas about power and legitimacy, it might also be able to deal
with thé ambiguity of thé manifold social actions that in most societies
can be labelled as violent.' Ambiguity refers hère to thé very divergent
évaluation of action based on harmful physical force. Few if any societies
are consistently 'pacifist' in rejecting ail violent action: in sortie conditions
it is seen and experienced as necessary, inévitable, justified, or even
psychologically rewarding.
In this chapter I examine thé construction and expression of violence
among thé Suri (or Surma) of southern Ethiopia, a pre-literate, non-
industrial society of agro-pastoralists at the margins of a state society.
This group does not share our (Hobbesian) model of man (being hère
similar to thé related Mursi people, as claimed by Turton 1994a: 21).
While in général terms thé Suri cannot be called 'more violent' than, for
instance, people in Western industrial society, theirs is a setting within
which thé workings of some elementary rules of violent behaviour in
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face-to-face relations, and between groups who know each other very
well and are strongly dependent on each other, might be observed. The
Suri case could hence tell us about this cultural, symbolic dimension of
violence in small-scale non-stratified societies, and make us doubt the
often-heard statement that violent behaviour is usually meaningless and
irrational. It can on the contrary be claimed that it is nearly always
'meaningful' (cf. Blok 1991, and above). In some respects, violence can
be an 'organizing principle' in society, not only in moments of crisis but
also to structure a part of human expérience and values. Whether the
Suri or related groups can be said to have a 'culture of violence' is a
debatable point. This concept has questionable analytical value, and carries
the danger of essentializing a group tradition which is in reality fluid and
adaptive. It is, however, a term in the local discourse used by their peasant
neighbours victimized by their raids.
David Riches (1991: 295) has succinctly described violence as: ' . ..
contestably rendering physical hurt'. This refers to social interaction
whereby intentional harm is done, and where the views of perpetrator
and victim (and witnesses) are the issue of dispute, these parties being
conscious of the problematic aspects and of different views on the
(il)legitimacy of the harm done. The définition (compare the Préface,
above) points also to the fact that violence, even in its most crude and
apparently aimless forms, always has an aspect of'communication'-be
it as a statement of social protest, intimidation, terrorizing, or of self-
assertion-and thus of certain cultural représentations or values. Violence
is also 'rupture', immédiate and challenging action, demanding a response.
It may in ail cases be tied to questions of social honour and of the integrity
of thé person or thé group as thèse concepts are defined on a personal or
cultural level.
The communicative, or 'performative', définition of violence à la
Riches was perhaps meant as a step toward a theoretical framework and
as tooi for a more adéquate ethnography of violence, assuming its
universality but also seeing thé culturally quite varying degrees of defining
or contesting some social behaviour as 'violent'. But thé définition
excludes several forms of action which we would call violence from an
outsider's point of view, e.g. when rendering hurt or intimidating persons,
or for that matter, animais, is not in a particular culture seen as contestable
(yet). For instance, Bloch's description (1992) of the sacrificial rite as
being 'violent' (the shedding of blood through killing, with the purpose
of 'appropriating' some other being's life force) will not count as such in
many cultures.
Hère we intend to follow thé wider or 'weaker' conception of violence,
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along Bloch's unes. It is too restricted to only speak of violence when
bloodshed among humans and destruction of thé social order are involved.
The challenge is to look for thé cultural roots and antécédents of violent
response in order to trace how 'aggressive', 'destructive' and 'murderous'
violence of people could at ail émerge. The local people and thé repré-
sentatives of the Ethiopian state in thé area which will described hère say
that thé Suri violence (i.e., what they see as their disregard for life and
property, their raiding, their ambushing and killing others) '... is simply
in their culture'. Does such a statement make any sensé? To answer thé
question thé loose conception of violence is needed, which emphasizes
that violence consists of thé human use of symbols and of acts of
intimidation and/or damaging—potentially lethal—physical force against
living beings to gain or maintain dominance.
Chai-Suri Society: thé Ecoîogical, Political and Social Setting
The Suri are an East Sudanic (Surmic)-speaking group of agro-pastoral-
ists, somewhat comparable to other East African peoples many of which
have been well-studied in anthropology (Nuer, Dinka, Maasai, Turkana,
Karimojong). Their historical origins are still unclear, although they hâve
clear linguistic and cultural connections to other agro-pastoral East
Sudanic (Para-Nilotic) speaking groups in thé région. At présent they
form a Community with a strong sensé of group identity, an aversion
toward a settled agricultural way of life, a 'warrior ethos' (on which more
below), and a cultural focus on cattle. For the most part of their recorded
history (in oral tradition) of some 200 years, thé Suri were independent
cattle-herders in thé Ethio-Sudanese borderlands. The Suri région became
part of Ethiopia in thé early twentieth Century, but, being remote from
thé highlands where thé central state was located, it was never well
connected or integrated into it. The Suri consist of two sub-groups, the
Tirma (about 11,000 people) and Chai (about 16,000). The remainder of
this essay will deal with the Chai. They live in the area southwest of the
small town of Maji, about sixty miles north of Lake Turkana.
Environmental and Economie Factors
The Chai area is an undulating savannah lowland zone south of the Maji
highlands in southern Ethiopia, near the border with Sudan. The land is
fertile due to the volcanic soil, but rainfall is unreliable, especially in the
plains where they keep their cattle-herds. The rain is insufficient for




shifting cultivation of staple crops (maize and sorghum). Apart from cattle-
herding and cultivation the Suri are engaged in hunting. At the end of the
dry season (Maren—April), there is a problem of water and pasture, with
staple-food supplies running very low. They have both agricultural and
agro-pastoral groups as neighbours.
The most prized possession of the Suri are their cattle-herds. Cattle
do not provide more than about a third of the food supply (milk, blood,
occasionally méat) but are a store of wealth which is necessary for
establishing social bonds and marriages and which can also be traded for
grain in times of need. In a cultural sense, the possession of cattle is also
tied up intimately with ideals of Chai social personality, adulthood and
individual dignity both for men and women (who also have rights of
possession). Young men are expected to be committed to herding the cattle
and defending it against raiding outsiders. On this basic level - i.e. that
of their mode of subsistence and of 'compétition for resources' — the
readiness to confront and use violence (repulsing and/or killing the raider-
enemies) is an essential requirement of the Suri way of life, and is not
seen in any sense as problematic or contested.
Internai Relations
The Chai have no 'chiefs' but there is a ritual leader or figurehead, called
komoru. The incumbent always comes from the same ancient clan. He is
chosen by community consensus and installed by elders in a special
ceremony. He has no executive or commanding authority when in
fonction. His main rôle is to be a focal point of normative unity of all
Chai. The British anthropologist D. Turton, in his work on the related
Mursi (cf. Turton 1975: 180), has called the priest-like figure of the
komoru a 'conductor of absolute power' (connected to the sky-god Tumu).
The komoru is expected to emphasize values of restraint, to be non-violent,
and to reconcile the various domestic units, clan groups and local
communities if need be.2
The Chai also know an âge-grade System, with four ritually separated
grades of which the third one (called rôrà) provides the 'reigning' one
(age set) and has its own name. The initiated members of this grade
provide the main decision-makers and authority figures. Women dérive
âge-grade status from their husbands, and are not separately initiated.
Chai live in compact villages, with members from various clans. A
clan identity is only important for the choice of marriage-partners
(exogamy). Several villages form a territorial unit (called b 'uran), which
originated as a co-operative herding unit of its male members. Domestic
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units led by married women are the foei of social life. There is little
stratification in terms of possessions and wealth. Social relations outside
village or b 'wran-membership are formed on the basis of ritual bond-
friendship (established through cattle-exchange), with other Suri as well
as with non-Suri.
Inter-ethnic Relations
Chai society, both internally and in its relations to other ethno-cultural
groups, is marked by frequent violence. Ambushes, robberies and killings
between members of the different groups occur on a regulär basis. These
incidents appear to have gained in intensity in the last decade (see Abbink
1993b, 1994). It is likely that external factors, such as the nature of state
— local society relations, changes in the regional power balance, as well
as the influx of technologically advanced automatic rifles have played a
décisive rôle hère. These factors, to which we return below, have partly
disturbed the 'ritual control' of violence within Chai society itself. It can
be claimed that Chai violence indeed always moved between the two
pôles of ritual Containment and political strategy. The former element
was related to keeping equilibrium in their own society, the latter to
safeguarding access to pasture, water holes, fields, and other natural
resources vis-à-vis other pastoralist groups (Nyangatom, Toposa and
Mursi), and agricultural neighbours (Dizi, highlanders). In recent years
there were additional political-ecological factors at play, and these brought
them in conflict with the Anuak and the agricultural Dizi people as well
(see Abbink 1993a). Especially the relations with the latter, now their
most immédiate neighbours, deserve to be considered.
Historically, the Chai were located near Mt Naita (called in their
language Shulugui), a border mountain between Sudan and Ethiopia.
According to their oral traditions they were formed there or 'arrived' in
this area about two-hundred years ago. However, in the past decade, the
Chai gradually filtered into areas formerly used by the Dizi people for
cattle-herding, hunting and apiculture. The Dizi were an hierarchical
chiefdom society, with elaborate rank distinctions. Since the early
twentieth Century they were heavily exploited by the northern Ethiopian
settlers, and their numbers dwindled. Relations between Dizi and Chai
are important for two reasons: a) both Dizi and Suri traditions maintain
that their leading families share common descent and cannot intermarry;
b) historically, they instituted a kind of ritual alliance in matters of rain-
control. While the Chai (and Tirma) leaders (komorus) were recognized




was ascribed to the Dizi chiefs in thé adjacent mountains (see Haberland
1993: 253). Under this 'rain-pact' itself, thé Chai — m times m drought,
food shortage, cattle disease or other problems - were permitted to enter
the areas claimed by the Dizi. This important cultural agreement was a
kind of temporary sealing of a balance between these groups, and might
be seen as codifying thé exploitation of different but partly overlapping
and complementary ecological niches. There was - and still is — economie
exchange between them (cattle, pottery, iron products, grain, garden
crops), and also frequent inter-marriage, although mostly in the form of
Chai men talking Dizi wives: in itself a sign of Chai dominance.3
Suri Culture and the 'Ethos of Assertiveness'
It was noted above that on the level of the Chai mode of subsistence and
the readiness to confiront raider-enemies, violence is emphatically present.
Violent action — raiding, ambushing killing enemy raiders and their
dependents — is not seen in any sensé as problematic or contested. But
the Suri attitude towards violence is more than just essential self-defence.
An imagery of tension and of violent confrontations, with the use of force
and aimed at domination, is woven into many aspects of Chai life: into
ideals of manhood or social personality, and in genera! in a ritually
expressed concern with what we might call 'expansive reproduction':
the growth of herds and of family and offspring. For outsiders, this attitude
is refiected in many cultural metaphors which permeate Chai (Suri) culture
(culture we defme here as the more or less durable, shared and transmitted
patterns of behaviour in which collective ideals and norms of a group are
expressed and which form an element of identity formation), and even in
the self-name 'Chai', which means: 'We revenge, we pay (them) back'.
For the Chai themselves, this imagery or symbolism of 'violence' does
not count as problematic either.
We immediately note two thmgs: first that this 'violent imagery' is
mainly an aspect of the construction of the male gender. Females, while
sharing the values underlying it, are not socialized to perform it except
in a verbal manner. Second, we see that this imagery or symbolism is not
seen as problematic or as referring to 'violence' by the Chai themselves.
This is done only by exteraal observers who are not part of the culture
and who are not involved in the system of local group relations focused
on cattle-herding and collective self defence.
The various realms of social discourse which serve to construct shared
cultural scénarios for the Chai — and which are even shared in outline by
their agro-pastoral ist Nyangatom neighbours, very similar to them in way
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of life — might also be said to have psychological aims. first, to force
new members of society to overcome thefear of violence, of armed attack,
of wounding and killmg. Intercstingly, Chai say that young boys have to
learn to suppress a 'natural inhibition' against the Spilling of blood and
against violently inflicting harm on others. A second aim may be to
mculcate the idea of the immanence of violence, i.e. death, or the flowing
of blood, in various stages and crucial moments of the life-cycle. When
these two aims are achieved, violence is both domesticated, 'embodied',
and made instrumentally userai (see following section).
This violent imagery is expressed in at least the following three cultural
metaphors/schemas, which teil us about the indigenous Chai conceptions
about human motivations and relations. These are important to consider
if we want to advance theorizing about violence and warfare and their
relation to culture (cf. Turton 1994b: 25).
The sacrificial metaphor: the équation of the killing and offering of a
consecrated (domestic) stock animal with bénéficiai effects for humans.
This is done at certain cérémonial occasions, for instance: marriage, burial,
age-group initiation, a rain-ceremony, installation of a komoru, and also
at a major public debate, or sometimes in case of serious illness. (As in
most pastoral societies, cattle méat is hardly eaten outside a ritual context).
The core ideas behind putting a consecrated animal to death are perhaps:
substitution and vicarious victimization, because thé violence is performed
for the benefit of the human sacrificers. Maurice Bloch ( 1992) has called
it 'rebounding violence', whereby the 'vitality' of a live being once killed
ritually is deflected towards humans (utilized for human purposes). The
effectiveness of the sacrifice is predicated upon the close (social) bond
between humans and domestic (livestock) animais. The cattle also provide
the bride wealth, and thus the medium for marriage and, ultimately,
fertility. The flowing of blood thus is essential, yielding bénéficiai results.
The idea of sacrifice was also relevant in the context of inter-group
relations (see below).
The purification metaphor: the idea of purification is pervasive in Chai
culture. People involved in homicide or in handling corpses at burials
but also in adultery are to be temporarily isolated and cleansed. They can
only be made 'normal' members of society again by cleansing themselves
with the freshly spilt blood of a stock animal. To purify, in this respect,
means to kill and to transfer something of the life-force of the animal
which was killed. Humans only then are able to re-enter social life. At
the same time, to purify with the fresh blood is to redraw a boundary
between individuals who were earlier socially separated by their violence,
seen as a transgression.
-83-
Jon Abbink
The achievement metaphor: a Chai's personal history or social career
is important. His/her personality and deeds may live on beyond the life-
span, and in this awareness, people try to make a name for themselves,
as 'warriors', cérémonial duellers, public speakers, important family
heads, or ritual experts. Achievements are often reflected in personal
favourite-cattle songs (roga kiyogâ bio) or battle songs (kirogenyö), which
every adult male has. They are composed by men in the junior age-grade
(tègay). Most men keep working on such songs during their whole life,
changing and adding text. Such songs can speak of deeds donc in raids
and war, in other dealings with neighbouring and/or enemy peoples, and
of actions carried out during the defence of cattle herds and of their own
favourite animais. Violent moments or episodes are an inévitable and
desired element of such achievements.
Another moment of achievement is, of course, gaining social adult-
hood. This adulthood is not 'just there' when people come of âge, but
must be achieved by having shown valour and personal strength (demon-
strated in cérémonial duelling, see below), by capable herding, and by
going through initiation (by retiring elders) into the senior age-grade.
For this, they must have demonstrated their being worthy of it. This is a
function both of time passing and of appropriate behaviour of the junior
grade (see Abbink 1994, 1998). Hence, adulthood cannot just be taken -
it is only reluctantly accorded to the newcomers by the outgoing elders.
The ritual of the initiation has 'violent' aspects (i.e. physical harm is
involved): elders (both men and women) insult the new candidates, give
them exacting and humiliating tasks to do, deprive them of food, and
lash them with whips until their backs bleed.
These domains reveal underlying values and violent motifs active in
the constitution of the Chai social person, especially vis-à-vis outsiders.
In their turn, these motifs and values inform cultural scénarios in Chai
society. Linger (1992) has used the concept of 'cultural scenario' to
indicate the expectsd behaviourai 'performances' of values in action. For
him, the briga, the violent street-encounter in Brazilian urban society,
follows a known, shared 'scenario', a scripted course of meaningful action
in which the participants know what to expect. It is marked by emotional
commitment and shared assumptions and values. Even though the actions
are violent and can end in death, they are set in a model, which has
psychological and cultural components inhibiting direct aggression but
communicating its message. The important point is that briga violence,
although ambivalent because of its two pôles of fascination and restraint,
is not aimless, chaotic violence which suddenly erupts. A similar point
can be made for Chai violence, which also follows cultural scénarios.
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The Exercise of Violence
In this section, the practice of violence, i.e. the production and enactment
of some frequent 'violent' behaviourai patterns ('scénarios') in Chai
society is reviewed. Two kinds could be distinguished: the ritually enacted
'domesticated violence', and the external violence, i.e. relating to non-
Chai. In the first instance, violence is transformative, i.e. fulfils an essential
rôle for individual Chai in becoming füll or accepted members of society;
in the second instance, it is constitutive of their own group, a necessary
inversion of peaceful social relations in certain conditions requiring
distance between them and others.
Ritual Enactment of 'Domesticated Violence'
One finds thé following forms expressed within thé Chai group.
• Duelling (thagine).4 A major event of domesticated violence is male
cérémonial duelling. This is done with big pôles made of tough wood,
of ça. 2.10-2.40 mètres length. The main contestants are young men
of thé tègay age-grade (unmarried) coming from différent territorial
settlements and/or clans. They hold several matches and return-matches
over a period of a few months every year, supervised by référées (oddä).
The thagine-duel is strictly contained by rules of procedure, and the
killing of an opponent, on purpose or accidentai, is prohibited. If it
occurs, homicide compensation should be negotiated. Social relations
are perceived to be disturbed between thé family groups of victim and
killer as long as a deal is not made.
Three aspects of thèse duels stand out. First, thé thagine ostensibly
is a forum for mâle compétition and acquisition of culturally approved
status among peers and also vis-à-vis girls. They allow young, ambi-
tious men, eager to start life as independent household-heads, to show
their strength and virility. This latter aspect is explicitly recognized by
nubile Suri girls: thé duelling provides a place of mâle - female
contacts, whereby girls among themselves make a fîrst choice as to
whom their partners might be, although there is no corrélation of being
the winner and being the most populär person. Second, it can be
interpreted, in psychological terms, as a training ground for youths to
explore thé fascination and energy of violence in a controlled manner.
Thirdly, thé duels are forums where competing village communities
within Suri society meet (People from thé same village can never
compete). On thèse occasions, where thousands of people gather, thèse




Figure 1. Chai duellmg m progress
> The procedure of homicide compensation (ligin). When an internai
homicide has occurred, thé lineages of victim and perpetrator are in a
state of conflict, whereby in principle revenge can be taken at any
moment. People avoid normal social contacts. After some months,
negotiations are started, by neutral members from another lineage or
clan group. These must lead to thé fixing of a compensation sum and
to the agreement to hand over a young girl to thé victim's group. The
killer and thé closest mâle agnate of thé victim must also be purified
with the blood of a sheep. Without this ordered procedure to restore
thé peace, feuding would ensue.
'Blessing of the raiders' (dirâm). This is an essential ritual supervised
and carried out by thé komoru. Before going on a raid for cattle,
participants (who virtually all are of the tègay âge-grade) hâve to bè
blessed and ritually protected from death and defeat. This is donc in
the compound of the komoru, and should proceed according to a strict
and faultless procedure. The raiders are smeared with a protective black
clay and jump across thorn-bush branches, which symbolically stand
for thé enemy. They also threateningly face thé komoru as if to attack
him - an act to challenge his blessing and divert the power which he
has (via thé connection with the sky-god).5 The speeches by elders
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Figure 2. Spilling sacnfical blood m a homicide purification ritual cuttmg open a live
sheep
and thé blessings of thé komoru are füll of violent imagery, cursing
the enemies, calling upon the raiders to be fearless and dauntless in
their attacks. They are expected to make effective use of violence and
to corne back with glory (They announce their 'successful' mission
upon return in their village with a special boasting song). In the
knowledge that thé opponents do exactly thé same, there is hère again
no controversy on thé use of violence.
The ritual killing of livestock («Ma). This is a very common event,
violent although not directed at humans. Tt is donc when people hâve
killed some one (on purpose or by accident), at an initiation-ceremony,
a divinatory intestine-reading, a marriage, or a burial. The ideas of
substitution and of cleansing through blood and death come back hère.
The manner in which thé cattle or sheep are killed has its own meaning,
but is seen as cruel by outsiders: it varies from cutting thé throat, or
slowly bludgeoning an animal to death (cattle), to slitting open the
stomach before it is dead (sheep).
Body culture. One could see certain Chai body treatments as violent,
though they are again not 'contested' (except by government agents,
who discourage it): thé piercing of lips and ear-lobes with sticks and
inserting big wooden and clay dises; the making of scarifications with
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a razor blade on the arms, back and abdomen of women; the kicking
out of lower incisors with a stone, and thé 'honorific' räfö-scarifications
(carved in the skin by an âge-mate) for people who have killed. In ail
thèse cases, blood flows and pain is inflicted, but only in order to
enhance culturally styled personal purposes: respectively aesthetics,
âge status, and personal achievement and prestige in the eyes of peers.
It is not seen as a contested infliction of harm. This is all part of the
self-conscious cultural body aesthetics which Chai emphasize vis-à-
vis other groups, and which is, for instance, completely lacking among
thé Dizi people.
External Violence: Ritual and Political
We hâve seen that thé Chai had social relations of exchange, ritual
friendship bonds (laalé), and of joint exploitation of pasture and water
resources with their Mursi, Nyangatom, Dizi and other neighbours. Thèse
groups had close social relations with them, which were fully taken for
granted. But, with thé exception of thé Mursi, such groups remained
outside thé Suri 'moral community'. As thé complementary side of thèse
close social bonds, thé Chai always knew various forms of violent
behaviour and conflict in their dealings with them:
• The stealing of crops and individual cattle without violent assault. Thèse
matters, if thé culprits could be found, were resolved through talks
and compensation on an individual or family level.
• Ambushes, to kill an individual or traveller from another ethnie group
either to rob grain, clothes, tools, a gun, or cattle, or just to kill to
prove personal 'courage' (by a tègay, a junior âge-grade member).
• The raiding of enemy cattle camps or compounds, with violent deaths
of both defenders and attackers. These were short hit-and-run raids,
with a brief and intense attack under a barrage of rifïe-fire and a quick
retreat.
• Occasionally: destructive one or two-day battles to destroy enemy
settlements or wipe out its people. This was battle-warfare (kamari),
and was the most serious form of violent interaction between two ethnie
groups. Chai have had such fights with ail their neighbours, except
thé Mursi. The purpose in such large-scale attacks was not only to
steal cattle, but also to capture women and children, who were then
incorporated in Chai society. While thé violence used was intense and
often deadly (hacking with knives and spears, shooting at close range),
forms like râpe or torture of the adversaries were, however, unknown.
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One notes that the context of this external violence may be partly
'resource compétition' and partly political strategy: thé (re)drawing of
group or territorial boundaries between political units. They do not fight
because they are 'separate groups', but thé reverse: in order to become
so. This also holds for thé Chai in their dealings with neighbouring groups
(compare thé same argument on thé Mursi by Turton 1994a).
Relations with thé agro-pastoralist Nyangatom were based on an
implicit and recognized balance between two similar groups. They had a
comparable acephalous organization and age-group System, a similar
subsistence base, etc. Violence was a 'normal' social activity, not problem-
atized as such. It also had a code of conduct: even in serious things like
cattle-raiding, for instance, there was the rule of the preliminary marking
(in thé neck) of a few cattle from a targeted herd before thé actual raid
would take place. Conflict between thé Chai and Nyangatom was, in sum,
a way to express or assert a boundary with the 'significant other'. The
killing of a Nyangatom allowed a Suri man to make thé prestigious ridô
scarification on his arm.
With thé agricultural Dizi people, who dominate thé highlands north-
east of thé Suri and hâve a very différent economy, culture and political
ideology, relations were not based on perceived similarity. The Chai
always had a disdain for thé Dizi and their sedentary, agricultural way of
life. But their obvious group différences — despite thé myth of common
descent of their chiefly families - were codified in an explicit 'contract'
of rain control, based on thé metaphor of sacrifice. In times of drought,
thé Chai would pay homage to the Dizi chief of the highlands, bringing a
black ox and a black goat for sacrifice by thé Dizi chief. The political
tension (between two basically unequal groups) was 'appeased' in this
agreement, thus keeping inter-group violence at bay through thé metaphor
of ritual sacrifice (substitutive violence). There were incidents between
individuals of thé two ethnie groups, but no major violent confiicts or
battles. Neither did Suri apply thé nWô-markings.
The above éléments shape thé Suri practice of violence and define
their habitus (in Bourdieu's sensé defined as human dispositions acquired
in society due to a process of internalization of external 'objective' social
conditions). The habitus is also incorporated into action, feeling and
thinking of individuals in a spécifie society, often in a quite literal sensé,
since thé emphasis is on the bodily basis of thèse dispositions. This is
also evident among the Suri. A habitus is, however, not static.
v •• * •L.̂ dÜL
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FigureS. Wolekibo and Mesfm. two members of the tègay âge-grade
Transformations of the Violent habitus
Since a décade, thé face of violence among thé Chai and their neighbours
bas changed in some important respects. Although the traditional situation
of 'normal' relations between thé ethnie groups in thé area was not so
harmonious as oral tradition asserts and therefore should not be glorified,
it is apparent that the past years have shown a serious crisis in inter-ethnic
relations. This kind of situation of local crisis and increased violence is
seen général in many parts of Africa, due to internai and external factors
(often in the context of globalization processes), bringing together various
sphères of interaction and articulating conflicts of interests. Traditional
rituals and customary law usually cannot achieve what they were designed
for in bygone days. Local societies are structurally unable to maintain
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their integrity and moral fibre, due to drought and famine, population
pressure, faulty state policies, tourism (see Abbink 1999), modem
éducation and new criminal activities.
As a resuit of récent political and other changes in thé Maji area, both
thé internai 'ritual' Suri violence as well as thé violence towards other
groups tend to break thé bounds of custom and to turn into thé uninhibited
use of force (This was also the opinion of the Chai elders, though
expressed differently). While this use efforce makes new options available
for local people, it also tends to endanger the co-existence of groups as
well as the peace in Chai society itself. Relevant factors have been
population movements in the Ethio-Sudan border area due to the Sudanese
civil war, increased local conflicts about pasture and water holes, periodic
drought and famine, epizootics, a temporary retreat of central state
authority from the local scène (especially in 1991—3), and generational
conflict among the Suri.
All this was coupled with the rapid spread of automatic weapons among
all groups, which changed the extent and intensity of violent encounters
(see below). These factors have contributed to more inter-group conflicts,
a décline in market contacts and a virtual halting of shared use of the
environment and of mutual social contacts (including intermarriage and
ritual friendship bonds). A three-year record that I kept of violent incidents
between the Chai Suri and the Dizi (leaving out the conflicts which either
group has had with another neighbouring population), shows at least sixty
incidents with a fatal outcome, the number of people being killed ranging
from one to several dozens per case. (With other ethnie groups like the
Anuak and the Nyangatom the Suri also have violent conflicts, but due
to geographical séparation between mem, the number of confrontations
and of casualties has been less than with Dizi and highland villagers).
One of the problems to explain is why violence 'got out of hand' and
led to a break-down of social relations between the Chai and other groups.
Is it because their cultural models and their habitus were, in a sense,
'violent'? In the course of the conflicts with the Dizi, one can see a
qualitative différence in the view on, and exercise of, violence, especially
among the members of the tègay age-grade (see Abbink 1994): violent
action - attacking and killing - became an aim in itself, a medium of
self-glorification and of personal status which, while based on assump-
tions and ideals within Chai society, has gone well beyond them.6
To understand why this happened, we recall two genera! factors. First,
the Chai subsistence base. They are transhumant herders and shifting
cultivators, not sedentary farmers: they have never invested in long-term




between 'territories' and 'resources' are not to be strictly observed, it is
against the nature of their open economy and flexible 'membership
pohcy'. If such a closure occurs, due to conquest and exclusion policies
(e.g. of Nyangatom, due m lts turn to population growth and also Kenyan
military pressure) or to developments of 'sedentarization' and administra-
tive boundary-making, violent conflict cannot but increase. This is what
has happened in the past decade. There is less and less room for Chai to
follow traditional stratégies of conflict resolution: avoidance, migration,
or division and territorial spread of groups.
Second, the process of state expansion in the Maji area. Since the turn
of the Century, when it was nominally incorporated into Ethiopia, Maji
has always been a 'frontier area', incompletely administered and on the
margins of the state monopoly on violence. Recent efforts to re-establish
the state after the change of regime in 1991 have 'problematized' all
expressions of Suri violence. The state is by nature presenting itself as
the normative, overarching authority which should have the exclusive
use of legitimate force as well as combat 'harmful customs'. Local
violence of Chai or of any other group is proscribed, regardless of its
context (this was already the case under the previous state-communist
regime of Mengistu). The state représentatives have also, at various points,
tried to prohibit many Chai activities or customs: not only cattle-raiding,
ambushmg, etc., but also the more innocuous things like animal sacrifice
(the killing of cattle for divination or funerals), the customs of ear- and
hp-plates, removal of lower incisors, and body scarification (These were
called 'harmful customs' in the 1987 constitution of the previous regime,
a concept which returns in the policy documents of the post-1991
government). Recently, in 1994 and after, it was also tried to ban the
cérémonial duelling contests.
It is obvious that this so-called 'civilizational offensive' represents an
assault on the socio-cultural fabric of Chai society. As the Chai are held
responsible for most of the violence in the Maji area, state officials think
that by reforming the what they see as overall violent character of Chai
culture they can halt violent conflicts. It is, however, likely that if this
state campaign to 'reform' Chai culture — by banning the customs just
mentioned — would be successful (it is not), the violence against non-
Chai would notably increase when these domesticated forms of violent
expression would cease to exist. In addition, while the state discourages
or forbids even Chai self-defence and redressive action against enemy
raiders, at the same time it cannot guarantee defending the Chai and their
territory against such raiders (e.g., from the south or from Sudan),
nor protect them from drought and subsistence crises, factors which
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necessitate at least some violent action. More immediately important
factors stimulating the overall use of violence have been:
l . The wide availability of automatic rifles and ammunition from both
Sudanese and Ethiopian sources.
2. Continued ecological pressures: drought, cattle disease, more scarcity
of bush land for cultivation and pasture for livestock. There was a
major famine in 1984-5 and again one in 1994, and in early 1997.
This contributed to theft, ambushes and raiding.
3 . The conflict in southern Sudan, which became the source of population
movements in the région, pushing the Toposa to the western borders
of the Suri territory, thus making their pastures and their old ritual
sites, chiefs' burial places and settlements unsafe, and posing a threat
to their cultural and also physical existence.
The effect of such changes in the socio-political and physical environ-
ment on the Chai, and on their use of violence in their relations with
other groups, has been dramatic, although it is not a one-way causal chain
—the developments in their own society have combined with such external
factors to reinforce crisis and violent conflict.
It could be seen most clearly in the crisis in the âge-grade System,
which is the core of their political organization and internai order (cf.
Abbink 1994; 1998). In the age-grade system, the elder or reigning age-
set of róra is to be accorded respect and obédience from the younger
one. They occasionally expect to be honoured and, in a metaphorical
sense, 'fed' in récognition of that fact, e.g. by being offered sacrificial
cattle. Their blessing of the land and the cattle and their authority on the
basis of age is seen as a necessary element in the social order. But it was
resented by the reigning age-set called Neebi (= 'Buffaloes') that the tègay
were always taking violent initiatives on their own, not sanctioned by
public décisions at meetings. The tègay, mostly younger herders who
lived in the cattle camps (in an area six hours' walk from the villages),
could assert memselves because of the power of their rifles and on their
growing economie leverage (as herders and as gold traders: see Abbink
1993a). Also in other domains the respect of the younger génération
toward the elders and parents was diminishing, even within families:
personal property and heads of cattle were often taken away by young-
sters, without the consent of the parents.
The growing violence perpetrated by Chai youths initially convinced
Chai elders (who control the date and the proceedings) that the new age-
set initiation, which was already due in the early 1 980s, should be delayed.
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With this, they expressed that thé Chai first should formulate an answer
to their problems, such äs being exiled from their country, recovering
from the drought and famine penod in the mid-1980s, running into trouble
with the Dizi and the Anuak (which endangered normal social relations
and trade), and not respecting the eider génération. The tègay were blamed
for all this, and the elders did not have a clear answer to the problems.
The increased violence had brought out internai contradictions in the âge-
grade System and the authority structure and norms it was supposed to
uphold. In fact the metaphor of âge organization as a cultural model of
ordering social life was fundamentally disputed.
The availability of automatic weapons, now acquired by virtually all
men, led also to changes in the concept of violent action and to new violent
practices. Above, we have discussed some core éléments of the cultural
basis of 'violent imagery' and action among the Chai. In the new situation,
their values of male achievement and réputation, raiding and hunting
exploits and cérémonial duelling provided a fertile basis for the expansion
of violent performance by means of the new weapons, for instance:
e Compared to the spears, knives and old three or five-shot rifles of a
génération ago, the possibilities of the Kalashnikovs, FALs and M-
16s seem to have a fascination and momentum of their own. Their
availability not only leads to mimetic exercise of violent acts by the
tègay vainly seeking récognition still structurally denied to them (see
above: the delayed age-set ceremony), but also giving the possessors
the idea of'social self-sufficiency': they explicitly de-emphasized the
value or even the need of normal social relationships as formerly
maintained with the neighbouring groups.
• The weapons also have been put to new use. For example, there have
been some unprecedented instances of Chai killing their own cattle to
prevent it from being captured and taken away by enemy raiders (This
has also been observed among the Tirma, and among other newly
armed pastoral groups in Uganda and Kenya, the Pokot, Turkana,
Karimojong, etc.). The reason given by the Suri herders of this highly
controversial and much debated 'innovation' in violent practice is that
the Nyangatom raiders hide between the captured cattle. There has
also been the gunning down of Dizi elders and women and the killing
of unarmed Dizi girls in ambushes, things not done in the recent past.
Through this violence, exercised largely with impunity, the Chai and
Tirma became more and more saturated with the feeling of power,
and challenged not only the Dizi peasants but also the state army. This
built up until October 1993, when a big Ethiopian army attack caused
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several hundred of Chai and Tirma (men, women and children) to die.
Only after this obvious defeat, the elders decided to hold the age-set
ceremony, initiating and conferring adulthood on the 'delayed généra-
tion' (see Abbink 1998). Since then, Chai Suri violence has decreased.
The Tirma sub-group, which has not yet performed the initiation ritual,
shows at present a higher level of violence than the Chai. Two other
internai changes in Chai society are the following:
® In the past six or seven years, thé institution ofthagine, the cérémonial
duelling, has undergone a metamorphosis. First of all, the frequency
of the contests has much increased. They are held almost every two to
three weeks over a period of three to four months after the main harvest
of sorghum (September-November, and after that as well, e.g. in
January and in the time of the first rains in April-May. Secondly, the
influence of the elders (including the komoru) and the référées over
the contesting parties has diminished: nowadays, the young men and
their friends continue as they like, and after one party has 'lost' one
contest, they grab their Kalashnikovs and start shooting (usually, but
not always, in the air) to show their irritation. This had led to several
accidentai killings. One can hear the Suri elders say that the meaning
of duelling is being eroded. We see here another cultural scenario in
flux, whereby accepted meanings of'violence' are transformed.
« There has been an increase in feuding: when a homicide is perpetrated,
Suri seem to lose the patience to sit out the traditional compensation
talks. The kin group of the victim, if strong enough, demands immé-
diate damages, or eise call for rétribution. Such feuding conflicts also
affected the family of the komoru. Among the Tirma-Suri, for instance,
there has been a long line of killings between two lineages since one
of their two komorm was accidentally shot dead: by a Tirma. This in
itself is unprecedented.
The above forms of violent behaviour are now also contested within
Chai society: elders, the komoru, and women especially talk against
wanton violence against Dizi and other travellers, against unprovoked
killing and robbery of former Dizi bond friends, and against the shooting
at duelling grounds.
The changes in the exercise of violence both within and without Chai
society points to major shifts of meaning. In fact, we see a movement
from ritually contained violence to political and instrumental violence,
the aims and meaning of which are less clear to everybody. There is a
phase of deep uncertainty and sometimes fear, of a transition of meanings.
There is an awareness that many of the tègay génération have abused the
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cultural norm of status acquisition on account of killing an adversary:
this happened only in battle with recognized, long-standing enemies (i.e.
not with Dizi and other highlanders except after manifest injustices). The
tègay do it repeatedly, 'without a reason', and break the rule of restraint
in violent behaviour.
Concluding Remarks
The Chai-Suri cultural style is marked by normative ideals of male
personhood and peer status which accord value to assertive behaviour,
which may translate into violent behaviour when material interests and
compétitive economie and social relations with other groups are involved.
Suri culture can, however, only be called a 'culture of violence' -
reproducing violent behaviour as a template, an ideal or a habitus — in its
relation to, or opposition to, those outside their moral Community.
Chai-Suri expressions of violence have shown important modifications
in recent years. While ecological and material conditions play a rôle in
explaining this, an anthropological, cross-cultural understanding of the
new dialectics of violent action needs to take into account how violent
processes actually unfold on the basis of symbolic—cultural représentations
and how they establish meaning, either instrumental or expressive.
In a way, violence breaks the bounds of normative culture, and of the
social system. The ritualization of violence is diminishing, and more
unstructured and unpredictable forms émerge. We see hère a society
pushing against its own structural and cultural limits6 that where thé resuit
of the long process of social évolution. In relations with neighbouring
groups (especially Dizi and Nyangatom), this Chai violence can still be
seen as a 'language', a communicative act, but mainly one of intimidation.
Violence in this sensé 'bridges' thé communication failures that hâve
cmerged, but it grounds group relations in suspicion and fear — in thé
absence of shared frameworks of control (cf. the breakdown of the rain-
agreement with the Dizi and of the fighting code with thé Nyangatom).
A more neo-functionalist explanation of violent behaviour, as offered
in récent evolutionary approaches, seems of limited value because it tends
to assume what has to be demonstrated in each empirical case (cf. Knauft's
criticism, 1987/8, 1991). For instance, thé interprétation of Chai violence
seems to preclude an easy association between successful raiding or
violent behaviour on the one hand and reproductive success on thé other.
Comparing census-material and involvement or prestige in raiding of
dozens of Chai men did not give any meaningrul corrélation. The most
important killers were not more populär with women and did not have
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more wives and children. Neither did they hâve larger herds. Certain rules
make accumulation of this sort difficult: thé captured cattle is being
divided among ail participants of a raid in a time-consuming and laborious
procédure. Other facts which réfute such a connection include thé position
of thé komoru: he usually has a large number of wives and children and
thé largest herd of cattle, but he is noted for his reconciliatory and medi-
atory rôle, and his role-model de-emphasizes aggressive behaviour and
aimless violence. We also saw already that in thé thagine cérémonial duell-
ing thé victors are not the universally populär guys outshining the losers:
all participants regardless of their place on the list of honour are esteemed.
What the examination of the Chai case suggests is that 'violence' is
an essential, inhérent part of social life, and need not be always be seen
as a contested practice, in thé sensé of unexpected or 'irrational' behaviour
towards others. This was true for thé Chai and thé Nyangatom - both
with the same focus on cattle-herding, both with a stratum of 'warrior-
herders', and with thé underlying idea that violent self-assertion, both in
ritual and in collective defence, was inévitable, a part of life. When people
were killed it was said to have been 'bad luck' for them, caused by, for
instance, failing ritual protection. It was not contested in itself. With thé
Dizi it was différent, but we hâve seen how thé latters' perception of
illegitimate, excessive Chai violence in récent years was partly generated
by thé breach of a previous 'historical contract', and by changing regional
and state-local society relationships, where different forms of incorpora-
tion into overarching political structures and value Systems (as expressed
in thé fight over the monopoly on the means and exercise of violence) of
both groups led to regional discrepancies and conflicts. The violence
against thé Dizi is now also problematic among thé Chai and is the issue
of many debates (cf. Abbink 1998).
'Violent practices' of thé Chai are a traditional concomitant of their
evolved survival stratégies as cattle-herders in a precarious natural
and human environment. Their communient to thé herds — to feeding,
defending, and expanding them - has led to a close socio-cultural bond
between humans and cattle, symbolically elaborated in their cultural style
and their values of social personhood and achievement. Violence is,
however, not simply a 'selectively advantageous trait' of Chai behaviour.
Their ideals and values certainly reflect a complex violent imagery, but
at the same time a pervasive sociality within and beyond their society,
suggesting that, on this elementary level also, both are inextricably linked.
This again shows thé ambiguity of violence as a category of social action:
it constitutes and it undermines sociality, thé latter especially when
released form its cultural formulations.
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When the Chai mode of existence is becoming more precarious or
even undermined, either by long-term disturbances in ecological condi-
tions or in the inter-group and state relations putting mem at a disad-
vantage, a recourse to more 'hard violence' will be likely. Traditional
understandings between local groups then lose importance, the regional
equilibrium is disturbed, and an overarching accepted state structure is
not present. Also, the continued availability of modern weapons and plenty
of ammunition has had a seductive effect on Chai young men, prompting
mem to use violence beyond any instrumental necessity. As we saw, this
has led to serious internai contradictions within Chai society, and to
décisive changes in traditional Chai meanings of violence.
In most of the situations which we presented, violence in Chai society
can be seen as a means to symbolically construct a group identity, or
'we-consciousness' - it is not there automatically. This consciousness is
based upon ideas of clan descent or affiliation, language, and a cultural
aesthetics expressed in décorative customs, but forged into an enduring
group identity - or at least into one valid for some purposes - within the
network of compétitive and exchange relations with other groups in the
région. As such, violence is inévitable, a fact of life, and not in any sense
problematic or destructive or an irrational régression to evil human nature.
When we talk about the violent 'images' in Chai discourse, the usefulness
of Riches' définition (see above) is limited: from a Chai point of view,
much of their violence is not 'contestably rendering physical huit', but
only uncontested, legitimate self-defence, retaliatory or pre-emptive
damaging of enemies, or bénéficiai sacrifice of animais, with which no
one in that context would argue.
Finally, this question of violence being 'contestable' in local Chai terms
would perhaps only arise when (a) according to the normative authority
figures such as elders and the komoru the people, especially the younger
génération, defy the rules and obligations and act on their own account,
thus changing or undermining the social order; (b) when new forms of
aggressively violent and wanton cruel behaviour would appear, such as
rape, torture, hired killing, or nihilistic destruction, well-known from
(post)modern industrial societies. The possibility that such forms can
émerge may not be precluded (as we know from cases elsewhere in
Africa). Subjectively perceived economie exploitation, unbalanced state
interférence, artificially hardened ethnie boundaries, unsolvable problems
of resource compétition combined with factors like the easy new tech-
nology and power of killing (due to the spread of automatic rifles, hand
grenades, and other small weapons) may préparé the ground for it. Also
more intangible factors connected to the process of globalization, such
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as the pénétration of a new cultural 'language' of visual images or of a
fantasized reality evoked by imported Western or Asian violent videos,
might enhance this process, as they can lead to internalizing new habituses
of violent practice and performance (In the Suri country there is at present
one rather unruly 'frontier town' where such videos are now becoming
readily available, also seen by visiting Suri). This process may then
invalidate - or at least transform - customary codes of restraint and social
order,7 as the Suri are gradually included in thé globalized domain of
'displaced signs' and 'commoditized symbols' through thé new média,
tourism, Christian missionizing and imposed state modemization projects.
The transformation of violence has been a multi-faceted historical
development in Western (and other) modernizing societies. In récent years
such a process has been occurring — though perhaps at a faster pace — in
extraordinary situations of disturbance and upheaval in, for instance,
PapuaNew Guinea, Mozambique, Libéria or Sierra Leone. The combined
impact of thé interférence of the state (with its hegemonie project), the
availability of automatic weapons, the new 'video culture',8 and increased
antagonism between competing groups (e.g. 'ethnie') might create a new
discourse of violence. This would hâve an impact on traditional under-
standings of violent performance. What seems likely in any case is that
more central state authority in thé Suri area will transform cultural notions
and patterns of violence but not cause thé disappearance of violence itself.
Notes
Fieldwork among thé Chai Suri in southern Ethiopia was done in 1991-
94 with generous support from the Royal Netherlands Academy of Science
(KNAW), the African Studies Centre, Leiden, and the Netherlands
Organisation for Scientific Research in thé Tropics (WOTRO, WR 52-
610), which I gratefully acknowledge. I also thank the Institute of
Ethiopian Studies (Addis AbabaUniversity) for institutional support, local
officiais and inhabitants of the Maji and Adikiaz area, and Mr John
Haspels, représentative of the EEMCY and LWF in Tulgit, Maji zone. I
am most indebted to the Chai people of the Makara settlement. I benefitted
a lot from the critical comments on a first draft of this paper from
participants in the International Seminar on the 'Ambiguity of Violence'
at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Social Anthropology, Göteborg
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University (July 1995). This chapter is a revised version of a text earlier
published in Cahiers d'Études Africaines (1998). I thank the Editonal
Committee of CEA for their permission to use that article.
1. Violence is used here as in the définition given in the Préface of this
book. Compare also Corbin (1977).
2. More on the authority structure among the Chai in: Abbink (1997).
3. In thé course of time, the Dizi - who also kept cattle in thé lowlands —
came to adopt several customs related to the 'cattle-culture' of the
Chai, but they never developed a comparable assertive ethos, empha-
sizing for example, personal violent performance, militant defence of
thé cattle herds, or a spécifie décorative 'body culture'.
4. In this and other sections I draw partly on material first presented in
Abbink (1993a; 1994).
5. In thé film The Mursi ( 1974, Granada TV, Disappearing World séries,
UK), thé similar ritual among thé Mursi, called 'spearing thé priest',
is shown.
6. In fact to such an extent that thé cohésion of Chai society itself was
endangered (see Abbink 1998).
7. Professor Bruce Kapferer rightly emphasized this point in discussion.
8. Its émergence and adoption in Africa should be investigated in détail.
The négative effects of violent and sadistic videos after their displace-








What does it mean to be a warrior? What does it mean to be a thief?
Historically, thé two are closely linked in thé pastoral and agro-pastoral
societies of Eastern Africa where political opposition was expressed
largely through cattle raiding. The feud, as we leamt from Evans-Pritchard
(1940), is a social relationship and a central social institution in such
societies. Yet, thé fate of thèse 'raiding societies' has diverged sharply in
this century. To simplify, in thé northern arid areas, Ethiopia, Sudan,
Somalia and the northernmost parts of Kenya and Uganda, pastoral
societies have been caught up in the maelstrom of wars. To the south, in
the better watered areas, we get a contrasting pattern, of relatively stable
state organization and an overall décline of the pastoral sector of the
economy as crops have increasingly been produced for the market. Both
developments have had a particular effect on the rôles of young men. In
the first group of societies, the military wing of the pastoral economy
has become ever stronger as the weakness of the state and the influx of
advanced weaponry has put a premium on defensive potential (Fukui
and Markakis 1994). As these societies have become ever more bellicose,
we hear of younger and younger men taking up arms to défend their
groups or recruited into armies fighting nationalist causes. In the second
group of societies, as raiding has lost its political valence, it has increas-
ingly come to be regarded as common theft, a mark not of gallantry but
of crime. It is these societies that have seen in the recent past self-help
used not as an instrument for inter-group compétition but as a means of
intra-group control.
In January 1995, while doing fieldwork in Kuria in southwest Kenya,
I was given a lift to town by a Luo driver. The conversation turned, as did
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